This paper generalizes the frequently used Hotelling model for twosided markets in order to determine the equilibrium market shares. We show that independent of whether consumers are uniformly or non-uniformly distributed, advertisement levels neither depend on the media price nor on the location of the media …rm. An increase in advertising revenues does not change location but only the media price. However, we show that if the distribution is asymmetric, market shares will be asymmetric as well, and that the media …rm with the larger market share has the higher media price. Thus, even in absence of any …xed costs, this …rm makes a higher pro…t per reader and in aggregate than its smaller rival JEL-Classi…cation: D43.
Introduction
Recent years have seen a huge increase in the literature on two-sided markets (e.g., Armstrong, 2006 , and Tirole, 2003, 2006) . The media industry is one of the most important examples of two-sided markets, and many papers have used Hotelling-inspired models to analyze media …rms'location, price setting on consumer markets and sales of advertising space. 1 However, most of the papers make very speci…c assumptions about competition for advertising and about consumer heterogeneity. In particular, it is typically assumed that consumers are uniformly distributed along the Hotelling line. This tends to oversimplify location decisions, characteristically resulting in maximum or minimum di¤erentiation, depending on the set-up of the model. This paper tries to make progress on our understanding of media …rms' location decisions and strategic behavior on the consumer and advertising market by relaxing the assumption that consumers are uniformly distributed.
Furthermore, we do not make any speci…c assumption about the type of competition in the advertisement market. Media …rms can compete by prices or by ad space, and we allow for both single-homing and multi-homing.
Within this set-up we show that a non-uniform distribution of consumers implies that the media …rms will end up with asymmetric market shares but with the same level of advertising revenue per consumer. We further show that the …rm with the smaller market share …nds it unpro…table to exercise its market power in the smaller segment by charging higher prices. On the contrary, its equilibrium price will be lower than that of its larger rival. The smaller …rm will therefore unambiguously be less pro…table than the larger one, measured both in terms of revenue per consumer and in aggregate.
The model
We employ a Hotelling model with two competing media …rms, i = 1; 2. Media …rm i charges price p i and is located at x i : Without loss of gener-ality, we assume that x 2 x 1 : The media …rms also sell advertising space to producers, and the resulting advertising level is given by a i : The media consumers may have negative or positive attitudes towards ads, and the net utility level of a consumer located at x who buys media product i is given by U = v p i t(x x i ) 2 d(a i ). With this speci…cation the consumers perceive ads as a bad if d(a i ) < 0 and as a good if d(a i ) > 0:
2 The constant v > 0 is assumed to be su¢ ciently large to ensure market coverage. Denoting the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying media product 1 and 2 byx; we …nd
Consumers located to the left ofx buy media product 1, while consumers to the right ofx buy media product 2.
The consumers are continuously distributed on 1 a < b 1; and the cumulative distribution is denoted by F (x): We normalize the population size to one, and the density function f (x) = F 0 (x) is assumed to be logconcave on [a; b] and twice di¤erentiable. The marginal costs of producing the media product equal c, and for simplicity we set marginal costs of inserting ads to zero, so that the pro…t functions of the two media …rms read as
where A i is advertising revenue per consumer. As usual in the literature, aggregate advertising revenues depend linearly on the number of consumers.
Otherwise, the model is very general. We allow both single-homing and multi-homing for the advertisers, and assume that ad revenues per consumer depend on the strategic variables s 1 and s 2 ; such that
Advertisement levels are a function of these strategic variables, such that
In a simple Cournot setting we have s i = a i . But the model also allows for price competition on the ad-market, i.e. it can accommodate competition in strategic substitutes as well as strategic complements.
In the following we consider a two-stage game, where the media …rms choose locations before they simultaneously compete for consumers and advertising revenue (setting p i and s i ; respectively). We assume that the pro…t functions (2) are quasi-concave in p i and s i ; and that solutions are interior.
Thereby, we can use the …rst-order conditions to determine optimal prices and advertising strategies.
As for prices we …nd that
and it is straight forward to verify that consumer prices are strategic complements (as is typically the case in Hotelling models).
From equation (1), we derive
and
The …rst-order conditions for advertisement strategies are given by
There are strategic interactions between the media …rms in the advertising market if the last term in the square brackets of equation (5) is di¤erent from zero ( @e x @a j @a j @s i 6 = 0; i 6 = j). 3 However, we do not have to specify whether the …rms compete in strategic complements or strategic substitutes on this side of the market: 3 We have @a j =@s i = 0 if the media …rms are monopolists in their respective ad markets.
We can now show:
Lemma 1 Advertisement levels depend only on the marginal disutility of adverts and not on the media price, the location of the media …rms or the size of the market.
Proof: See Appendix. Let the common equilibrium advertisement revenue per media consumer be denoted by b A. Using (3) and (4), we have
The di¤erence in the media prices is thus given by
The important message from equation (7) is that the media …rm with the larger market share charges the higher price; p 2 > p 1 if F (x) < 1=2 and vice versa. This is true even though there are no network e¤ects or other factors which make one …rm dominate its rival. The intuition for this result can be seen from equation (3); the …rst term shows that the gain for each media …rm of setting a higher price is proportional to its market share. However,
A both …rms face inter alia the same reduction in ad sales if they increase the price. Thus, the …rm with the larger market share unambiguously bene…ts most from setting a high price. Not surprisingly, the dominant …rm's ability to set a higher price than its rival is increasing in the di¤erentiation between the media …rms; (x 2 x 1 ); and in the consumers' transportation costs, t.
As in Anderson et al (1997) we can now write pro…ts as a function of locations only:
Let y denote the median consumer such that F (y) = 0:5. We are now able to demonstrate Proposition 1 If pro…t functions (8) are quasi-concave, …rm 1 has a higher market share than …rm 2 if f 0 (y) < 0; and a smaller market share if f 0 (y) > 0.
Proof: We can write the location as an implicit function (see (1)):
Marginal pro…ts with respect to locations can consequently be written as:
Logconcavity of f (x) implies @e x=@x 1 = @e x=@x 2 > 0 (see Anderson et al (1997) , p. 107) and 2f
An interior solution to (9) thus satis…es x 1 > a and x 2 < b. Let us evaluate the marginal pro…ts if both …rms choose locations such that the median consumer is the indi¤erent consumer, i.e. if e x = y. De…ne
Since @e x=@x 1 = @e x=@x 2 , marginal pro…ts for e x = y are equal to
Suppose that …rm 1 has chosen x 1 such that its pro…ts are maximized and …rm 2 has set x 2 such that e x = y holds. From (10), it follows
Hence, …rm 2's marginal pro…ts are positive if f 0 (y) < 0, and negative if Note carefully that the market share result holds both for the media market and for the ad market. Since ad revenue per consumer is the same across …rms, the media …rm with the larger market share ends up with higher mark-ups in the media market and higher total ad revenue. In this sense the two-sidedness of the market tends to favor …rms with large market shares, even though there are no economies of scale nor any network e¤ects.
Concluding remarks
Our paper has demonstrated that a generalized Hotelling model of two-sided markets behaves like a standard Hotelling model in which ad revenues just reduce marginal production costs. More importantly, we have demonstrated that market shares di¤er if the distribution of consumers is asymmetric, with the dominant …rm charging the higher price. In particular, our model may explain why market shares and pro…ts di¤er in two-sided media markets even if production costs do not.
Appendix
By inserting for (p i c + A i )f (x) from (3) into (5) we have 
In equilibrium, @ 1 =@s 1 = @ 2 =@s 2 = 0: Equations (11) Expression (13) implicitly determines the advertising level as a function of the marginal disutility of ads and the ad revenue function. Even though the media …rm with the larger market share has the higher total revenue from ads, the ad revenue per consumer is thus independent of the market size and the media price. 
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